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Charles W. Roe

THE BRAZILIAN POLICY DECISION ACKNOWLEDGING A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AGAINST THE AXIS - AUGUST 1942: ITS IMPACT UPON POLITICAL REFORM, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

Thesis
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THE BRAZILIAN POLICY DECISION ACKNOWLEDGING A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AGAINST THE AXIS - AUGUST 1942: ITS IMPACT UPON POLITICAL REFORM, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Submitted In Partial Fulfillment Of
The Requirements For The Degree Of
Master Of Arts In Law And Diplomacy

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See also Mr. Roe's other paper, "U.S.-- Brazilian Military Cooperation in World War II" also in support of this degree.

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PREFACE

The analysis of the Brazilian policy decision to militarily participate in World War Two involves the consideration of numerous factors, the ramifications of which must be considered, if a proper understanding of the action is to be achieved.

Brazil, under Vargas, in the period 1930-1945 was undergoing a process whereby the nation was becoming a united entity vice a lossely connected political system embodying great regional diversities, antipathy toward the central government and animosity directed against competing regions.

Although industrialization had commenced in Brazil prior to 1930, it was centered in the southeast in the vicinity of Sao Paulo. This virtually ensured uneven economic development and a near monopoly of political power for the representatives of that area.

Vargas, upon assuming power in 1930, began the process whereby the central government would, in reality, exercise its authority over the competing regions to such an extent that regionalism would no longer be a divisive factor in Brazilian political life. In retrospect, attention was being focused on ensuring that the first function of a political system would be performed, that of uniting the nation and providing politically effective

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government throughout the country. This was the first order of business, Vargas realized, prior to initiating a program of economic development.

From a cursory examination of economic development throughout the world, it seems apparent that the method decided upon in any particular country is a reflection, not only of the internal conditions and external influences, but the timing involved in making the decision, which naturally bears a direct relationship to social reform and political development.

This paper will endeavour to analyze the Brazilian policy decision to opt for war and its subsequent impact upon social reform, industrialization and political development with the intent of deriving a general developmental model relevant to countries currently in the same development stage as Brazil in 1942. Obviously, it is impossible to examine the decision in depth within the confines of this paper. However, I shall consider the major factors influencing the decision, the actors involved, the events surrounding the decision and its effects in terms of models previously derived by Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, Albert Hirshman and K. H. Silvert.

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Chapter I

PRELUDE TO WAR

THE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Brazilian political system, in the period of interest, was a continuation of the system initiated by Vargas as the result of a revolution against the duly constituted central government in October, 1930. Vargas, not recognizing the results of the election in May, 1930, had with the support of powerful interests in Minas Geraes and Sao Paulo, replaced the constitutional system with the first dictatorial system in the post monarchical evolution of Brazil.

Although the constitution of 1891 had been suspended by decree in November of 1930, the decree in itself embodied a constitution that served as the basis for the Estado Novo (new state) inaugurated in 1937. From 1930, until the establishment of the Estado Novo, including the year 1934, with the promulgation of a new constitution and its guarantees of freedom of political association, the Vargas regime ruled with some semblance of constitutional legality.

In 1937, with the presidential term of Vargas nearing its termination date, the conservatives and liberals forced a showdown by choosing candidates to oppose him in

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the forthcoming presidential elections. Using the Communist/Integralist threat as an excuse, and with the support of the military leaders, Vargas decided on a coup d'etat to consolidate his position as the ruler of Brazil.[1]

Using troops to surround Congress, meeting little resistance and with the support of the armed forces, Vargas proclaimed himself president, dissolved Congress and promulgated the Estado Novo, thus setting the political stage for the entrance into World War Two.

The Estado Novo, despite a constitution (Fascist sounding), suspended the political process by dissolving the legislature, prohibited elections and ensured a personalistic government under Vargas.[2] The intent was to remove all intermediate groups between the government and the people with emphasis on authority which could only restrict freedom.[3] Coupled with the above, was the rigorous restriction of the press. Despite the political retrogression, the coup received the loyal support of the workers, unions and elites with the inarticulate masses remaining indifferent.[4]

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1. Karl Lowenstein, Brazil Under Vargas, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1944), pp. 34-37.

2. "Brazil: The New Ally," Fortune, November 1942, p. 108.

3. Frederick B. Pike, ed., Freedom and Reform in Latin America, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 298.

4. Ibid., p. 299.

the revolutionary precedents of conditions. Under the [illegible] Republic's efforts to [illegible], and with the support of the military leaders, Diaz [illegible] on a [illegible] to consolidate his position in the [illegible] of Brazil.[1]

Under pressure to surround Deodoro, Benjamin Diaz mobilized and also his support in the armed forces, Diaz articulated [illegible] problems, [illegible] Deodoro and personalized the [illegible] over, thus [illegible] his political stage for the [illegible] [illegible].

The [illegible] area, demanding a constitution (Lei-Maior assembly), supported the political [illegible] of [illegible] the institutions, established elections and [illegible] a presidential [illegible] [illegible].[2] The [illegible] was to [illegible] all [illegible] [illegible] the government and the people [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] knowledge.[3] Coupled with the above, was the [illegible] mobilization of the [illegible]. Despite the political [illegible], the [illegible] the level [illegible] of the [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] with the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].[4]

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1. [illegible] Gomes, [illegible] [illegible], (Rio [illegible]: [illegible], 1974), pp. 34-37.

2. "[illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]," [illegible], November 1982, p. 328.

3. [illegible] p. 329, ed., [illegible] and [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible], (South [illegible] University of [illegible] Press, 1971), p. 324.

4. [illegible], p. 329.

The regime was a personalistic dictatorship vice a new world variety of European totalitarianism. Vargas, in his drive to centralize his power, placed his supporters throughout the administrative machinery on both the state and national levels. Moreover, he succeeded in winning the support of a satisfactory number of the oligarchy in each state, all of which was accomplished without an organized political party. Thus, with administrative control, concurrence of the military and popular support, Vargas was solidly entrenched at the seat of political power behind a facade of representative control.[5]

With the reins of power firmly in his hands, Vargas began the task of instituting reforms designed to advance Brazil. Being firmly committed to the idea of social reform, Vargas enacted social and labor legislation which placed Brazil among the most advanced countries of South America.[6] Included in the social legislation was a comprehensive minimum wage law, subsidized housing in the largest cities and state labor tribunals to regulate labor disputes. In effect, the right to strike was

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5. Martin C. Needler, ed., Political Systems of Latin America, (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), p. 427.

6. Samuel Guy Inman, "The Brazil of Vargas," Nation, October 12, 1940, p. 324.

[illegible] The truths [illegible] a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

negated thus destroying the concept of a free trade-union movement.[7]

To compensate for the reduction in the power of labor, there was little government interference in business profits which obliged employers to accept the social legislation.[8]

We appointed excellent men to office, occasionally protected the integrity of the courts and improved government administration.

In contrast, there was no congress or elections, the economic life of the country was dominated by the state, labor unions were not independent entities responsible to the membership and the radio, press and schools were under the DIP (The Department of Press and Propaganda).[9]

It is probably safe to speculate that the great masses were concerned with reform and not liberty, the two ideals being divorced, for all practical purposes. The population wanted low cost housing, better wages and security rather than votes, not realizing that if they

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7. Walter R. Sharp, "Brazil 1940 Whither the 'New State'," Inter-American, Quarterly, October 1940, p. 5.

8. Ibid., p. 8.

9. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning to Present, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 762.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].[7]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

had the latter, the former would follow. In short, they were in basic agreement with the view of Vargas that the vote does not fill the stomach.[10]

The main elements of the Brazilian political system can be characterized by the following:

a. A dictatorship under a constitution implemented only by dictator decrees.

b. Liberal tendencies as manifested by the advanced social and labor legislation.

c. Visual forms of democracy non-existent, i.e., elections.

d. Brazilian politics dominated by the army with the support of the troops based on personal loyalty.

e. Brazil being made safe for democracy by dictatorial methods.[11]

By the beginning of World War Two, the political system that had emerged was of a generally rightist-authoritarian pattern.[12] A civilian led government was dominated by the agricultural half of society as a result of the centralization of power by Vargas and supported by the military.

Vargas, as the leader, although desirous of reform, had to move relatively slowly in this regard and talk even less of the subject, for fear of being "unhorsed."[13]

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10. Pike, Freedom and Reform in Latin America, p. 299.

11. "South America VI: Brazil," Fortune, June 1939, p. 138.

12. Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, (New York: Frederick Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. 62.

13. Inman, "The Brazil of Vargas," p. 324.

but all Saints, the Prince Andre claims. In short, they exercise their economic and political power in ways that are quite some via the Kitli are always.[10]

The main elements of this Brazilian notions battle are as characterized by the following:

a. A dramatic open a constitution implemented and by dictator Vargas.

b. Liberal Constitute is modified by the so-called social and labor legislation.

c. Visual form of [illegible] non-contract, i.e., admission.

d. Brazilian politics dominated by the very vast the support of the [illegible] on personal loyalty.

e. Great being made safe for [illegible] or [illegible] economic welfare.[11]

In the regulation of [illegible] in Iran, the political [illegible] that involved the of a [illegible] radical-nationalistic notions.[12] A political [illegible] was dominated by the [illegible] of [illegible] in [illegible] of the [illegible] of power [illegible] and [illegible] in the military.

Japan, in the [illegible] although [illegible] of reform, had to have relatively [illegible] in this regard and [illegible] even line of the [illegible], the [illegible] of being "[illegible]."[13]

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10. [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] in [illegible], p. 209.

11. "[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]," [illegible], June [illegible], p. 102.

12. [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible], (New York: [illegible], Inc., [illegible]), p. [illegible].

13. [illegible], "The [illegible] of [illegible]," p. 364.

This necessitated a delicate, political balancing act whereby reforms could be achieved in the face of strong opposition while still maintaining power. Only a master politician could hope to achieve his ends under these circumstances which accounts, perhaps, for the regime appearing opportunist, pro-Fascist and pro-U.S. (all unevenly mixed) concurrently.

Anthony Patric, a foreign correspondent in Brazil for many years, commented on the Vargas regime in the following manner:

> "The dictatorship has really very little weight on the people's liberty. It is a dictatorship in name only and people here are still as free as ever."[14]

This statement, undoubtedly, is a rather reliable assessment of the Brazilian political system, for the population did not conceive of themselves as being oppressed by the regime. However, the operative words are those at the end of the quotation. People are free only in the sense that human dignity is considered to be important, there is personal security within the framework of the state and provision is made for each individual to obtain for himself a proper level of subsistence consistent with needs of the state. Since freedom in the aforementioned sense was never had by the Brazilians prior to Vargas, they were, in effect, "as free as ever."

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14. Anthony Patric, Toward the Winning Goal, (Rio de Janeiro: 1940), p. 316.

Nevertheless, as previously elucidated, Vargas was desirous of moving Brazil toward the stage at which freedom, as we know it, would be a reality. The fact that he never achieved his objectives should not be allowed to obscure his intentions.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Brazilian-German relations in the thirties were extremely amicable, primarily as the result of the German drive to exert influence in the Western Hemisphere and the unwitting acquiesence of Brazil in this objective.

Hitler, in a discussion with one of his lieutenants on the subject of Brazil stated that "We shall create a new Germany there....We shall not land troops like William the Conqueror and gain Brazil by the strength of arms. Our weapons are not visible ones."[15] The Fuhrer was referring to the promotion of subversion from within by the large numbers of German immigrants settled in southern Brazil.

Besides retaining close contacts with the German immigrants, the Germans conducted commercial relations on a bilateral basis in a manner so as to tie Brazil into a permanent trade relationship. This was manifested in the

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15. Herman Rauching, The Voice of Destruction, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), p. 61.

Personality, as psychiatrist Hildebrandt, Tuppen and Karpman (Jewish Family Service) see it, is a process of making choices, or in some sense, would be a reality. The fact that he never received his potentiality should not be allowed to consume his behaviour.

PRACTICE REVISION

Emotional-Physical problems in the children were apparent, probably as the result of the mother's inability to exert influence in his behaviour and the resulting weaknesses of Heinzl in this objectives.

Initially, in a discussion with one of his kindergarten on the subject of Heinzl stated that "he would create a lot behind chairs...he doesn't see I don't like it. I tell him the teachers and girls don't want it in the playroom of course. Our rooms are not visible enou."[12] The teacher was reluctant to the problem to visualize from within to the broad domain of Jewish Institutions involved in creating Heinzl.

Heinzl met least other children with the barrier behaviour, the teacher noticed instructional relations on a bilateral basis in a manner [illegible] to his Heinzl like a personal view relationship. This was modified in the

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12. Jewish Children, The Place of Institution, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), p. 61.

Aski-mark system whereby Germany purchased copious amounts of Brazilian goods and paid for them in blocked marks which could be spent only in Germany. Direct barter agreements were also designed to maintain German influence in the Brazilian market.[16]

The purchase of Brazilian goods at prices ten to fifteen percent above the prevailing level and sale of goods to Brazil at prices below those which the United States offered also influenced trade in the German direction.

German and Italian military missions were active in Brazil during the same period, for they considered their military activities as a means of influencing governmental policies. A favorable effect, insofar as the Germans were concerned, of the military collaboration was the attendance at German military schools of large numbers of Brazilian military officers. This was particularly advantageous, since the military exercised an inordinate influence in the formulation of policy decisions.

Brazil, as a result of the above, purchased large quantities of military equipment from Germany and, in fact, had the bulk of her armed forces equipped with Nazi weapons.

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16. Fortune, June, 1939, p. 151.

The zenith in the attempt to influence Brazil through the military was reached when Hitler invited the Brazilian Chief of Staff, General Pedro Amalio Goes Monteiro, to visit Germany in order to lead a crack German regiment down the Unter der Linden in Berlin.[17] Although flattered, and contemplating accepting the offer, General Monteiro refused in order to accept a counter-proposal of the United States.

Other measures were undertaken to consolidate the German position. For example, the employment of German nationals in managerial positions, the emphasis on investment in distribution/export-import concerns and the extension of German, or German dominated airlines throughout Brazil.[18]

The Vargas regime, being semi-Fascist in structure and methods, naturally tended to admire Germany which promoted close relations until the Axis threat became a reality in the early forties. Just prior to this time, Vargas, while enacting strict measures of control internally against German machinations, maintained friendly external relations with the Axis making his position with regard to the United States unclear.

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17. The New York Times Magazine, May 22, 1939.

18. "Brazil: The New Ally," Fortune, November, 1942, p. 214.

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

Early Pan-Americanism was a reflection of the desire to maintain peace within the hemisphere rather than guarding it from abroad.[19] In achieving this objective, the United States by its actions in the Caribbean, regardless of intent, disturbed the tenor of our relations with the whole of Latin America.

Brazil, shared the view of the remaining American republics that the U.S. policy was a hypercritical means for annexation of territory.[20] Therefore, even though relations for a lengthy period had been friendly, the U.S. was viewed with suspicion and was considered the real menace. This was true, despite the fact that in Brazil's commercial relations the United States was her most important, single customer.

Brazilian-U.S. relations in the decade preceding World War Two were, for the most part, conducted in a friendly atmosphere. The Good Neighbor Policy, promoted by F.D.R., did much to ensure the goodwill of the Brazilians despite the anti-U.S. military chiefs.

Diplomatic relations, from the Seventh Inter-American Conference at Montivideo in 1933 until the Rio

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19. John I.B. McCulloch, "Challenge to the Americas," (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1940), p. 7.

20. Duncan Aikman, The All American Front, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1941), p. 7.

[illegible] was a reflection of the [illegible] in some white [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible].[19] [illegible] [illegible] minority, the [illegible] of [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible] the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], [illegible] the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

conference in January, 1942, progressively improved to the point where Brazil became an active participant in the promotion of U.S. objectives.

Brazil, at the Panama Conference of 1939, agreed to the creation of the neutrality belt around the hemisphere and economic cooperation to alleviate the stresses/strains to the economy caused by the war. At the Rio meeting, she provided the compromise which ensured the success of the conference. The United States was adamant that there should be a unanimous severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis. Chile and Argentina objected, thus creating an impasse, the resolution of which, not only promoted the conference objectives, but placated Brazil's wavering army officers.[21]

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oswaldo Aranha, was definitely pro-U.S. When the final decision as to which side to support in the world crisis had to be resolved, his influence with Vargas, in opposition to the army leaders, was a decisive factor in promoting full cooperation with the U.S.

Military relations during the era of the Good Neighbor policy were conducted on a distant plane since the bulk of the military assistance was provided by

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21. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning To Present, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 806.

[illegible] to [illegible], 1962, [illegible] [illegible] to the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible], in the [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible], [illegible] to the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Germany. The one bright spot in the relationship was the small navy mission which performed its function of promoting goodwill and increasing the effectiveness of the Brazilian Navy so well, that the naval officers were pro-U.S. on commencement of the war, in direct contrast to the generals.[22]

As the war interrupted the shipment of arms to Brazil, she turned to the U.S. for weapons. The U.S. agreed to supply the needs of the Brazilian armed forces, but due to the necessity of equipping the rapidly expanding American armed forces, was unable to do so until U.S. weapons production was in full swing. This issue of weapons supply was vexations matter which continued to hamper U.S. military policy in Brazil until resolution of the problem. For example, the U.S. wanted to provide forces for the protection of Northeast Brazil in addition to obtaining base rights for the Army Air Force and Navy. Negotiations were continually frustrated until U.S. arms started to move southward under the Lend-Lease program.

In summary, U.S.-Brazilian relations during the Vargas regime, slowly evolved from a formal, distant relationship to one of extremely close cooperation in all

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22. Samuel Elliot Morrison, The Battle of the Atlantic War, May 1943-May 1945, (Vol. 10, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 15 Vols., Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1947), pp. 376-378.

Germany. The core problem that in the relationship was the small navy, having which performed the function of protecting convoys-all and increasing the effectiveness of the Brazilian Navy so well, that the naval officers were pro-U.S. on conclusions of the war, in direct resonance to the general.[22]

In the war intervened the shipment of iron to Brazil, the turned to the U.S. for weapons. The U.S. agreed to supply the needs of the Brazilian armed forces, but due to the necessity of equipping the rapidly expanding American armed forces, was unable to do so until U.S. weapons production was in full swing. This issue of weapons supply was problems military which continued to hamper U.S. military policy in Brazil until resolution of the problem. For example, the U.S. wanted to provide forces for the production of bauxite needed in addition to obtaining base rights for the Army Air Force and Navy. Negotiations were continually frustrated until U.S. aims started to move southward under the Good-Lange program.

In summary, U.S.-Brazilian relations during the Vargas regime, vitally revived from a formal, distant relationship to one of extremely close cooperation in all

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22. Manuel Aldite Ferreira, The Tangle of the Anti-Axis War, May 1942-Jan. 1945, (Vol. I, History of Brazil Before Every Concerning the World War II, 15 Vols., Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1947), pp. 376-377.

endeavours in support of the protection of the hemisphere. This, in the final analysis, measures the success of any relationship.

THE ECONOMY

Mention Brazil and immediately the thought of coffee enters the mind, for the two are almost inseparable. The impression received is one of an inordinate dependence upon a single crop (monoculture), which is thought by knowledgeable economists to be a curse, since it inhibits industrial development.

However, in Brazil's case, it was this extreme dependence upon coffee that provided the impetus for a real stimulus toward economic diversification. This occurred in the wake of the depression in the 1930's with a concomitant collapse in coffee prices and the release of large numbers of workers to industry.[23] Under Vargas, the ruinous policies of subsidizing coffee production and withholding it from the world market, which encouraged production in competing countries, were terminated.

By 1938, the decision was made to rely on the world market price for coffee production control. At the

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23. Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office, The American University, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Brazil, (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1964), p. 425.

[illegible] in spite of the prevailing of the institution. [illegible], in the final analysis, [illegible] success or non-attainable.

The Writer

[illegible] not invariably the [illegible] of [illegible] when the [illegible], for the two are closely [illegible]. The [illegible] problem is one of an [illegible] dependence upon a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] by [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] it [illegible] [illegible].

However, in [illegible]'s case, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] upon [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

commencement of the European war, this policy, in conjunction with emphasis on destruction of inferior grades and cultivation of superior varieties, had checked the superproduction.[24]

While contributing to the solution of the coffee problem, Vargas directed his attention toward agricultural diversification by subsidizing cotton production, and designing measures to deal with the sugar surplus.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the wartime demand for vegetable oils, fibers, rubber and other tropical/subtropical products was impressed on Brazil which embarked on immediate programs to increase production.

Concurrent with increased and diversified agricultural production, was the industrial expansion, concentrated primarily in the consumer goods industries, and the stimulation of mining operations.

All of the aforementioned measures contributed to the decreasing dependence upon one crop which had been characteristic of the Brazilian economy throughout its economic history. In the past, reliance had been placed on one crop, located in one area. This induced a boom

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24. Lawrence F. Hill, ed., Brazil, (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1947), p. 233.

commercial, if the Turkmen are, this point, is relinquished with regards to fabrication of textile fibers and utilization of cotton varieties, but retained for commercial uses.[24]

This contradiction in the solution of the cotton problem, Soviet issued in -- creating terms artificial diversification or substitution cotton problem, and industrial measures to deal with the cotton surplus.

After the Turkmen spinner or small farmer, the textile demand for cotton-fibre silk, linen, rubber and other synthetic/semi-synthetic products was increased in Russia which resulted in textile growth in Japanese production.

Concerned with increased and diversified artificial production, was the industrial commission, commercial priority in the cheaper goods industries, and the diversification of mining operations.

All of the aforementioned measures contributed to the increasing dependence upon and crop yield, but some characteristic of the Russian economy throughout its economic history. In the past, reliance has been placed on one crop, looking in one area. This indicated a lack

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24. Lazarus . Ibid, pp. Special Journals. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, p. 23.

or bust type of economy with alternating periods of relative prosperity followed by depression.

The emphasis on industrial production and agricultural diversification, therefore, contributed to the relative prosperity enjoyed in Brazil on the eve of World War Two.

In fact, in 1940, Brazil was experiencing a boom with an enormous amount of construction in housing, factories and municipal improvements. Woolworth's was selling goods, 95 percent of which were manufactured in Brazil.[25] Trade in virtually all types of products, increased in the period 1934-1940.

The economy was finally becoming oriented toward the direction of balanced growth when the war, with its shocks on the economic life, commenced in 1939. In any case, Brazil was in a position to benefit economically in the long-run, particularly with the assistance of the United States.

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25. Samuel Guy Inman, "Brazil of Vargas," Nation, October 12, 1940, p. 322.

on land area of economic and strategic importance to relative recently, finished by Germany.

The economic or industrial production and infrastructural core situation, historically, contributed to the primitive economic growth in small in the area of Asiatic Russia.

In fact, in 1940, Somall was constituting a zone with an economic market of consumption in manufacturing, foodstuffs and industrial raw material. Industrial's was million tons, 80 percent of which were manufactured in Somali.[35] Prior to its virtually all kinds of products, imported in the period 1940-1960.

The country was finally successfully reached the situation of balanced growth when the war, with its shocks on the economic life, commenced in 1990. In the end, Somali had to a position to benefit economically in the long-run, particularly with the participation of the United Nations.

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35. Samuel Jan Somin, "Impact of Trade," Nations, Volume II, 1960, p. 300.

Chapter II

EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

Vargas, in the period preceding the war, realized that Brazil would have to support one side or the other in the impending conflict. However, he delayed the support commitment, insofar as it was politically and militarily feasible. Furthermore, the possibility of military action against the Axis was practically non-existent. Hitler, and his legions, although not battle tested before 1939, were certainly impressive to the Brazilians.

Consequently, the decision to acknowledge a state of belligerency against the Axis in August, 1942, was the result of a multitude of factors, both external and internal, that influenced the decision.

Primary, amongst these factors, was the role of the United States. Basically, the United States was interested in Brazil in a strategic sense and as a source of raw materials vital to the war effort.

Brazil, by virtue of its geographical location, 1,620 miles from the Brazilian "hump" to Africa, provided the only logical access to the Western Hemisphere, if the Axis decided upon an external attack. Moreover, large unassimilated minority groups, German, Italian,

and Japanese, were situated in strategic areas of Brazil which could serve as focal points for internal subversion.

If the Axis gained a foothold in Brazil, the Panama Canal would be vulnerable, thus interdicting movement of the U.S. Navy and stripping the U.S. of its first line of defense in one of the two guardian oceans.

U.S. military planners acknowledged the vulnerability of Brazil, particularly in view of the inadequate nature of the Brazilian Armed Forces, and based their plans on preventing an Axis move toward the Western Hemisphere. Plans were formulated to send American troops to the Brazilian northeast in the event of an emergency.[1] Diplomatic efforts were directed toward obtaining Brazilian permission for U.S. armed forces to deploy to the Brazilian northeast, the development of Brazilian bases and the purchase of strategic raw materials.

In return for the use of the bases, and eventually, for the introduction of U.S. troops into Brazil, we endeavoured to supply the necessary equipment to modernize her armed forces.

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1. Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, (Vol. I., The United States Army in Hemisphere Defense, 6 Vols., The War Department, in process, Washington, D.C., Historical Division, Department of the Army, G.P.O., 1950), p. 6.

the Southern, were displaced by strategic areas of Brazil which would serve as rural nodes for internal subversion.

If U.S. took a foothold in Brazil, the Soviet Union would of necessity, take increasingly aggressive or risk U.S. and withdrawing her U.N. of its final line of defense in one of the two principal centers.

U.S. military planners anticipated the vulnerability of Brazil, particularly in view of the inherente nature of the revolution based forces, and based their plans on overrunning in this area toward the Southern centers. Plans were formulated to send Brazilian troops to the Brazilian northern to the south of an emergency.[1] Brazilian officers were trained under auspices in military participation for U.S. armed forces to develop to the revolution movement. The development of Brazil's role and its potential as a strategic base activity.

In preparing for war or of any kind, and especially, for the introduction of U.S. troops into Brazil, we endeavored to supply the necessary equipment to modernize her armed forces.

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1. See Jackson, Andrew, Brazil in Crisis: Brazil in the Post-revolution. (U.S. Dept. of Defense Study in Brazilian Studies, Vol., The Sao Paulo, in press, Jackson, C.J., Strategical Activity, Department of the Army, G.P.O., 1950), p. 6.

Although finally providing the requested weapons and military aircraft, the U.S. looked askance at a Brazilian war declaration, or for that matter, a declaration of war by any Latin American republic, since weapons and training would have to be supplied by the Americans. This was the situation in early 1942, when other areas and nations had a precedence over Latin America in obtaining supplies from the free worldarsenal.

Consequently, the U.S. supported the unanimous severance of diplomatic relations at the Rio Conference rather than a war declaration.

Shortly thereafter, in March, 1942, the United States and Brazil negotiated a series of agreements embodied in diplomatic notes and business contracts. In the agreements, in addition to providing for economic assistance, was a new lend-lease agreement calling for delivery of arms to Brazil with a value of $200,000,000 which was double the amount previously arranged for in 1941. Concurrently, the army agreed to deliver 100 medium tanks, more than 200 light tanks, fifty combat aircraft, antiaircraft and antitank guns.[2]

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2. Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, (Vol. 1, Western Hemisphere, 2 Vols., United States Army in World War Two, in process, Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, G.P.O., 1960), p. 316.

Although Fidelity was filled [illegible] [illegible] military [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] at a [illegible] or [illegible], or [illegible] [illegible], a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], where [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The economic agreement promoted the mobilization of Brazil's strategic resources by providing $100,000,000 for the purpose. A $5,000,000 fund was established by the Rubber Reserve Company (U. S. government agency), to be used in collaboration with the Brazilians in the stimulation of rubber production.

The last agreement was designed to subsidize the development of iron mines and railroads in Brazil.[3]

In May, 1942, a Brazilian-American defense agreement was signed coinciding with a fundamental change in U.S. army policy. The policy had shifted from the promotion of measures to place U.S. troops in Northeast Brazil to one supporting the utilization of Brazilian forces for defense, with support by the U.S. in the form of training and material.

As a result of the aforementioned measures, Brazil received U.S. army assistance and weapons valued at approximately $230,000,000.[4] The equipment munitions, tanks, trucks and small arms were sufficient to equip one-half of a division.

Additionally, the Brazilian Navy was augmented by

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3. David H. Popper, "United States-Brazilian Economic Accords of March 3, 1942," Foreign Policy Reports, March, 1942.

4. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 237.

The problem has [illegible] the possibility of [illegible] $100,000,000 in its [illegible]. [illegible] by the [illegible] Thus, it is [illegible] that, be [illegible] in the [illegible] of [illegible].

[illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].[3]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

the transfer of naval craft from the U.S. under lend-lease. Eight destroyer escorts, eight patrol craft, one transport and two yard craft were consigned to the small but efficient navy.[5]

To assist the Brazilian Air Force, (F.A.B.), numerous training planes and several squadrons of combat aircraft were assigned to Brazil, in addition to the licensing of local factories to produce trainers and engines.[6]

Large numbers of Brazilian pilots were also trained in the U.S. by veteran pilots at bases such as that at Suffolk, Long Island, which provided advanced aerial combat instruction.[7]

The Brazilian armed forces, at the commencement of the war, were totally insufficient to engage in combat against a modern power. The navy, was composed of naval craft which were, for the most part, obsolete. The army of about 100,000 men was sufficient to maintain internal order, but also unprepared to engage in modern warfare.

The U.S. assistance program was designed to remedy

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5. Samuel Elliot Morrison, Supplement and General Index, (Vol. 15, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 15 Vols., Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1962), p. 115.

6. New York Times, August 24, 1942, p. 5.

7. Ralph Salozar, "Prelude to Battle," Inter-American, December, 1944, p. 22.

[illegible] Bank [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the defects inherent in the defense posture of Brazil and in so doing, provided the military means to support a Brazilian war declaration.

In addition to providing the wherewithal for military action, the U.S., on the diplomatic front, had inexorably promoted the total alignment of the Latin American states against the Axis. Brazil, as the keystone of hemispheric defense, was the primary focus of our efforts in this direction. Manifestations of this U.S. interest were reflected in the various inter-American conferences from 1939 onward. Brazil, by participating in the neutrality patrol in furtherance of her official policy, and in the breaking of diplomatic relations at the Rio Conference, primarily as the result of the political groundwork fostered by the United States, placed herself in the position of a semi-belligerent with respect to Germany.

In short, the U.S. military assistance, diplomatic efforts in behalf of hemisphere defense and the promotion of the economic mobilization of the hemisphere with Brazil as the chief recipient of our largesse, probably exerted sufficient influence to make a Brazilian war declaration inevitable. In fact, I believe that even if Germany had not embarked on a campaign of submarine

warfare against Brazil in the months following the break in diplomatic relations, Vargas would have acknowledged a state of belligerency as a consequence of the above factors.

THE AXIS THREAT

The Axis threat in Brazil was, in the thirties, manifested internally in the economic penetration of the country, the military assistance programs and the problems concerning Axis espionage and propaganda. In addition, the problem of the minority groups aroused concern, particularly after the integralist effort to supplant Vargas. However, Vargas demonstrated that he was entirely competent to maintain a firm rein on the activities of the pro-Fascist elements within the country. Therefore, in regard to the threat that existed in 1942, it consisted primarily of a military threat which became a reality in mid 1942.

German plans never directly envisioned a specific attack on the Western Hemisphere via Brazil. However, a logical extension of their projected Gibralter/African plan (Felix) would have placed the Germans in control of Dakar. The U.S. acknowledged this threat by planning for defensive military action, whereas, the Brazilians

[illegible] would in the [illegible] utilize the [illegible] to [illegible] positions, which would have [illegible] a [illegible] or [illegible] of a [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible].

The [illegible] Theory

[illegible] in [illegible], in the [illegible], [illegible] in the economic [illegible] of the [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. In [illegible], the [illegible] of the [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

were not really convinced until Germany was exercising control of the South Atlantic straits in July and August of 1942.[8]

At this time, the whole Brazilian coast was on the alert with the Brazilian armed forces manning the beaches and the populace actually expecting attack. Several old battleships were towed into position in the harbors of Natal and Baia to provide protection in the absence of sufficient coastal defense guns.[9]

The military threat wasn't relieved until the Allies actually invaded North Africa in November of 1942.

Obviously, the threat of impending attack was a powerful factor in support of a war declaration.

SUBMARINE WARFARE

In order for a government to commit a nation to war, there has to be a reason which is sufficient to arouse the emotions of the populace. Regardless of whether or not the reason selected is the real reason, if the people can be aroused to an emotional pitch over an issue, a governmental decision for war will have the acquiesence of the large majority which is a necessity for the

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8. Edward Tomlinson, Battle for the Hemisphere, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 95.

9. Ibid., p. 96.

[illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

prosecution of a war effort.

In the submarine warfare conducted by Germany, the Brazilian government found this emotional issue and, despite the fact that it hedged upon making a commitment, the increased severity of the campaign eventually forced the government to accede to demands for war.

The movement toward war was relatively slow. For breaking off relations in January, 1942, the Germans, in reprisal, began to sink Brazilian ships. On March 11, 1942, the fourth Brazilian ship (5,152 ton Cayru) was sunk with the loss of 59 lives.[10] The following day, anti-German demonstrations took place in Rio de Janeiro with the demonstrators surging down the Rua De Ouvidor, the fifth avenue of the capital, wrecking German shops, burning books, and shouting "Down with Hitler."[11]

On March 23, 1942, the Germans attacked the Brazilian ship, Tacuate, near Port Said, for which an apology was issued.[12] In mid-August, five ships were sunk with the loss of 600 lives including those of 169 soldiers on an army transport.[13]

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10. "Carioca Bonfire," Newsweek, March 23, 1942.

11. Ibid., p. 32.

12. The New York Times, August 24, 1942.

13. Life Magazine, September 7, 1942.

[illegible]

[illegible]

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10. [illegible]
11. [illegible], p. [illegible].
12. [illegible], [illegible] 21, 1969.
13. [illegible], [illegible] 7, 1969.

Apparently, this was the breaking point as an angry populace filled the streets of the major cities demanding war.

In the meantime, however, the Brazilian Government was conducting an anti-submarine campaign in conjunction with the U.S. armed forces in Brazil. In may, 1942, several subs off the coast were attacked by mixed U.S.-Brazilian crews flying B-25 aircraft. One Brazilian crew reportedly sunk a submarine (Axis) in the latter part of May.[14] The Brazilian government, in reference to the campaign to wipe out the submarine menace, editorialized that sinking the submarines was not an act of war, but a legitimate defense against organized piracy.[15]

It is evident, that the submarine warfare campaign embarked on by Germany, after a shift of the wolfpacks to the South Atlantic to force the U.S. anti-submarine forces to spread themselves over a wider area, exerted a direct influence upon the decision for war by rallying general support of the population.

Superficially, this was the reason, but other reasons provided the real impetus for the decision. However, they were not sufficient to ensure support of the populace, which,as I pointed out, was a mandatory requirement.

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14. The New York Times, May 27, 1942.

15. Ibid., p. 3.

[illegible]

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Chapter III

INTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DECISION

NATIONALISM

In any consideration of a policy decision, one must take into account the influence of the external factors impacting upon the policy makers, which will naturally affect that decision. However, it is usually the internal factors which are, by far, the most important. A decision is possible wherein the external factors are ignored, thus serving to isolate the nation from the effects of the external factors.

For example, in the case of Brazil, the effects of the German submarine campaign could easily have been negated by the simple expedient of prohibiting Brazilian ships from plying international waters and suffering the hardships which this would have entailed. Similarly, the role of the United States, as it affected the decision, would have been superfluous, if the Brazilian government had maintained a rigid neutrality policy, regardless of U.S. fears and desires.

The point which I am attempting to make is that although external factors deserve examination, in the final analysis, the internal factors are decisive in any policy decision. In the present case, the influence of

the rising nationalism in Brazil was a definite factor in the making of the policy decision to participate in the war.

At this point, it is best to define the term nationalism so as to avoid the misunderstandings that so frequently occur in discussions concerning the nebulous term. For the purposes of this exposition, I shall define it in the following manner:

> "Nationalism is a melange of three of Silvert's categories; a symbolic concept, an ideology and a social value."[1]

There is no question that Brazil exhibited nationalism in regard to the juridical concept category (legal relationships between individuals and state, nationality, etc.), for many years prior to 1940.

Nationalism, as a symbolic concept, includes the affection and reverence for patriotic symbols (the flag), traditions, and the shared experiences so necessary to develop a national consciousness. Some political scientists have been advocates of the concept that in order to develop there had to be a common belief in a national myth and if one doesn't exist in fact, then it has to be created so as to provide a focal point for the cohesive political measures undertaken by the state. An example might be the myth that the United States has always

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1. K. H. Silvert, ed., Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development, (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 18.

the global situation in general and a definite change in the nature of the noting, which is [illegible] the [illegible].

In this case, it is just [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

supported the principles of freedom and democracy with no thought of gain in our international relations.

Nationalism, as an ideology, refers to the national objectives of a nation and its plans for their achievement as viewed by the leaders.

Extremely important is the concept of nationalism as a social value which is the end result of the efforts to unite a nation. It is manifested by the "feeling" of unity by the populace and their transfer of loyalties above the family, church and class to the state. When this concept is highly developed, the members of a nation will not only feel alike, but more important, they will act as a unit.[2]

In Brazil, the above concepts were, to varying degrees, influential in the final decision for war. Vargas, in his drive for centralized control of the country through the administrative heirarchy, the support of the military and the popular adulation increased the feelings of the people for national unity. In the preceding period, regionalism had a divisive effect upon the country. Consequently, search for a national identity wasn't undertaken until after World War I, for the Brazilians had

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2. A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 32.

[illegible]

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imported foreign ideas and institutions without regard for their internal effects.[3]

Vargas speeded up this search by the establishment of the "new state" which was decidedly nationalistic. For example, the majority of the employees in each job category had to be Brazilian, equal salaries had to be paid to local employees for the same job, and only government controlled companies could exploit the natural resources.[4] This was the beginning of economic nationalism in Brazil which is a reflection of the nationalistic concept concerning goals and methods for their achievement.

Other examples of the new economic nationalism were the efforts to concentrate on heavy industry and agricultural diversification, which it was hoped would result in the economic emancipation of Brazil. This was fostered by the new forces behind nationalism, the disallusioned youths dissatisfied with the constitutional framework of democracy, the ambitious politicians, army officers and the reactionary elements among the conservatives as an alternative to real democracy.[5]

Evidence of this desire for economic emancipation was the U.S. assistance for the Volta Redonda steel plant

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3. Foreign Areas Studies Division, The American University, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Brazil, (Washington, D.C., G.P.O., 1964), p. 405.

4. "South America VI: Brazil," Fortune, June, 1939, p. 140.

5. "Good Neighbors in the War and After," Foreign Affairs, April, 1943, p. 525.

[illegible] for their [illegible] political [illegible] for their interest [illegible].[3]

[illegible] created by this method [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

which was partially a payment for the use of the air bases on the "hump," but also a requirement to satisfy the nationalistic aspirations of the military chiefs.[6]

As the war continued and the U.S. sought to maintain the stability of the economy with economic assistance, the trend toward economic nationalism grew even stronger.

Duncan Aikman in the All-American Front outlines his views on nationalism in Latin America and agrees that the twenty republics were solidly committed to the concept. In his view, the nationalism exhibited in the forties was a synthetic nationalism based on an intense local patriotism as a result of petty differentiations in local traits and customs.[7] However, in a breakdown of the Latin American region into a common-sense nationalistic pattern, he sets Brazil apart on the basis of its racial composition and Portuguese inheritance.

This is an important facet of the nationalism demonstrated in 1942 when the population demanded war in response to the submarine attacks. Flags were waved, anomic demonstrations took place and signs bore the slogan, "we want war." Seamen gathered on the palace

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6. J.J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 167.

7. Duncan Aikman, The All-American Front, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1941), p. 159.

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6. [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] (Chicago: [illegible], [illegible] University Press, 1967), p. 327.

7. [illegible], The [illegible] (New York: [illegible], [illegible], 1961), p. 193.

lawn the evening of April 21st. Vargas addressed the assembly and stated that, "the sea is a symbol of liberty and a nation that does not protect its sea is not worthy to live."[8] The following day, an announcement was made that Brazil had acknowledged a state of belligerency with Germany and Italy.

The above events were an illustration of nationalism as it existed in Brazil, both as a symbolic concept and as a social value, for no endeavour requires the subordination of individual loyalties as the total commitment to a war against an overwhelmingly superior enemy at a time when the future may still be in some doubt.

There is probably some slight basis in fact for Aikman's contention that the nationalism in Latin America was synthetic, but in Brazil's case, I believe that the events surrounding the war declaration had to have some solid nationalistic basis in order to arrive at a genuine consensus among the populace. This was provided by the Vargas regime in the drive for social change which was reflected by the new industrial enterprises, urbanization, public health campaigns and social legislation. This resulted in support of the urban elite who demonstrated a

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8. "Brazil: The New Ally," Fortune, November, 1942, p. 212.

lace the wonders of Gorki Park. Varied individual life seemingly and crushed that, "life can be a symbol of liberty, and a battle cry that does not permit the man to not worthy be live."[8] The collective will, by comparement was made that Dwelli had established a state of belligerency with Germany and Italy.

The above essay, with an illumination of nationalism as it related to Dwelli, both as a symbolic concept and as a social value, for no reason during the revolutionaries or international socialism in the 1940's consistent to a war relying on overwhelmingly superior energy at a time when the Russian war still be in case doubt.

There is probably some claim being to find for Eisen's contention that the nationalist in Latin America was sympathetic, but in Dwelli's case, I believe that the events surrounding the war declaration had to have some solid nationalistic basis in order to prove at a minimum commerce among the populace. This was provided by the Vargas regime in the drive for social change which was reflected by the new industrial emphasis, urbanization, public health campaigns and social legislation. This resulted in support of the urban elite who demonstrated a

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8. "Dwelli: The New City," Tuesday, November, 1944, p. 242.

high degree of national consciousness, for they had a stake in the economic life of the country, the labor segment of the population, for they were the beneficiaries of the social legislation and the military as the implementors of the decision.

In retrospect, the nationalism exhibited by Brazil during the Vargas regime was a composite of the categories previously mentioned, a symbolic concept, an ideology and a social value. As such, it was a fusion of the nationalism as defined by the European experience and a type that was characteristic of the underdeveloped areas which is directed toward achieving an independence of foreign markets and sources of manufactured goods.

Vargas was not only an engineer of this impetus for national unity, but the recipient of its influence in the formulation of the policy decision under consideration.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

One of the foremost considerations in the formulation of United States policy objectives in Brazil was the economic mobilization of the hemisphere in support of the war effort. Brazil, as the richest storehouse of strategic materials in Latin America, occupied a primary place of importance in our planning. This was a virtual necessity to counter the Axis economic penetration and to

this course of action [illegible] nonintervention, for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the economic life of the country, the labor [illegible] on the population, for [illegible] the [illegible] of the social institutions and the stifling on the [illegible] of the district.

In retrospect, the antibandism activities in Brazil during the Vargas regime are a mixture of the [illegible] previously explained, a specific support, an ideology and a moral value. As study, it was a fusion of the traditionalism as defined by the European [illegible] and a type that/[illegible] elements of the [illegible] which is directed toward [illegible] the [illegible] of foreign markets and sources of [illegible] goods.

Vargas is not only a [illegible] of [illegible] for political [illegible], but his [illegible] of [illegible] in the formulation of the policy decision [illegible].

[illegible] activities

One of the [illegible] [illegible] in the formulation of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] the economic [illegible] of [illegible] to [illegible] the war effort. Brazil, by [illegible] economic [illegible] strategic materials to [illegible], occupied a primary place of importance in our [illegible]. This was a virtual necessity to [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] and to

ensure the continual flow of the strategic materials to compensate for the loss of sources of supply in the Dutch East Indies.

In order to obtain the strategic materials we required, and to stabilize the Brazilian economy, technicians, personnel, machinery, rails, port facilities and ships had to be diverted to Brazil. Since this necessarily involved extremely complicated economic problems, seven of nine principal advisors to Sumner Welles at Rio were economic advisors.[9] Full economic cooperation was pledged at the Rio Conference with the United States agreeing to provide consumer goods to the Brazilians on the same basis as our own civilians in return for their supplying the full range of strategic materials.

To implement these close economic ties, the U.S. and Brazil jointly agreed to cooperative measures to increase the industrial development and agricultural diversification of Brazil. Included in these measures were the projects expediting rubber production in the Amazon, the financing of the Volta Redonda steel plant, health and sanitation measures, and cooperative financial

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9. "Good Neighbors and the War," New Republic, January 26, 1942.

ensure the maximum flow of the strategic materials in shortages for the lack of answers or delays in the check-in lists.

In order to obtain the strategic materials in demand, and to stabilize the transition economy, technicians, personnel, machinery, raw, facilities and ships has to be directed to Brazil. These kind necessarily involved extremely complicated economic problems, even of nine political nations to remain safe as the very economic existence. Full economic cooperation was planned at the Rio conference with the United State working to provide economic goods to the Brazilians on the same basis as our own civilians in return for their supplying us full range of strategic materials.

To implement these close economic ties, the U.S. and Brazil jointly agreed to cooperative ventures to increase the industrial development and agricultural diversification of Brazil. Included in these ventures were the projects concerning rubber production in the Amazon, the financing of the Volta Redonda steel plant, health and sanitation measures, and cooperative financial

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[illegible]. "Good neighbors and the war," New Republic, January [illegible], 1942.

arrangements to stabilize the Brazilian economy. In addition, the United States supported the Inter-American Coffee Marketing Agreement designed to prevent competition and a price decline. This was of primary importance to Brazil in light of the independence upon this single crop.

After breaking diplomatic relations with the European Axis partners in January, 1942, Brazil delayed a war declaration for a considerable period of time, despite the fact that she was engaged in a campaign against the German submarines. One of the probable reasons was that Vargas had second thoughts about an irrevocable commitment which would transfer the trade flow directly to the U.S. from Europe. After the war ended, this disruption of the normal trade channels and full reliance on the U.S. might have some disastrous economic repercussions.

However, as the war progressed, the economic assistance provided by the U.S. was having an effect and what was more important, there was the prospect of continued economic assistance after the war ended.

Politically and economically, the two countries were now joined in an alliance. By a declaration of war, the economic gains to Brazil in the post-war period

[illegible] to utilize the [illegible] economy. In addition, the United States supported the Inter-American Defense Board [illegible] designed to promote cooperation and a sense [illegible]. This was of vital importance to Brazil in light of the Lusitanian [illegible] this [illegible].

[illegible] existence with the [illegible] in Europe. [illegible], Brazil [illegible] a war declaration for a considerable period of time. Despite the fact that she was engaged in a [illegible] against the German U-boats. One of the [illegible] reasons was that Vargas had ordered [illegible] ships in Brazilian [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] flow directly to the U.S. Ports [illegible]. Only the war ended, with [illegible] of the normal [illegible] and full reliance on the U.S. [illegible] economic [illegible].

However, as the war progressed, the economic assistance provided by the U.S. was [illegible] and was more important, [illegible] by continued economic [illegible].

Politically and [illegible], the two countries were now joined in an alliance. By a declaration of war, the economic [illegible] Brazil in the anti-Axis [illegible]

could be expected to far exceed any losses expected to occur from direct military participation. Vargas, carefully calculating costs and benefits in the economic sphere, was influenced to take positive action on August 22, 1942.

ROLE OF THE MILITARY

Samuel Guy Inman in 1940, characterized the Brazilian government in the following manner:

> "Its like a sailing ship, bending to the prevailing breeze, a German cyclone, or 'the trades' from Brazil's interior, or the North American breeze."[10]

One of the primary reasons for this indecisive governmental policy was the influence of the military in the Vargas regime.

When Vargas led the revolt in 1930, he was named Provisional President of the Republic by the military junta that hadassumed power. Many of the military leaders connected with the revolt remained in service and rose to high military position under Vargas. Consequently, there was a condition of mutual support during the Vargas regime.

The army had been equipped, trained and imbued with Fascist doctrine by the Germans and Italians during

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10. Samuel Guy Inman, "The Brazil of Vargas," Nation, October 12, 1940, p. 322.

would be arrested by [illegible] and Soviet authorities to [illegible] their military restrictions. Thus, [illegible] fully colonialize areas [illegible] in the economic [illegible], was instrumental in [illegible] on August 29, 1945.

[illegible]

Beginning [illegible] Japan in 1940, [illegible] Bonaparte [illegible] in the following manner:

> "The Japanese military [illegible] the prevailing [illegible] of the Korean people, [illegible] of the South Korean [illegible]."[10]

[illegible] of the military [illegible] for this [illegible] governmental policy was the [illegible] of the military in the Vichy regime.

[illegible] had [illegible] in 1940, [illegible] prefectural [illegible] of the [illegible] for the military [illegible] land [illegible]. [illegible] of the military [illegible] connected with the [illegible] resulted in [illegible] and [illegible] to high military [illegible] some [illegible]. Consequently, there was a [illegible] of [illegible] during the Vichy regime.

The army had been [illegible], divided and [illegible] with [illegible] doctrine by the [illegible] and [illegible] during

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10. [illegible] Bonaparte, "The [illegible] of Korea," [illegible], October 15, 1946, p. 320.

the thirties, which accounted for their pro-Fascist proclivities. However, despite the fact that they favored the Axis, (both the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, Eurico Dutro and Goes Monteiro, respectively, were decorated by Hitler), this didn't prevent them from being pro-Brazilian.[11]

In pursuit of a pro-Brazilian policy, they engaged in a fence-sitting exercise, committing themselves to neither side. Vargas was following the same policy which was symbolized by sending one son to school in the U.S. and the other to Germany.[12]

The military leaders, in hesitating as to a commitment, were primarily considering the military situation which in early 1942 was not very favorable for active Brazilian participation in the war. They were extremely reluctant to end up on the losing side. A secondary consideration was the effect that a pro-U.S. commitment would have on Argentina and Uruguay. Argentina's policy was one of opposition to the U.S. (pro-Fascist), which could have created a disturbance on Brazil's southern border.

As the war progressed and the military situation

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11. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning to Present, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 763-764.

12. Ibid., p. 765.

the United States, and is approached for their pre-medical preceptorships. However, neither institution has ever received the data, (both the institution or the 108 the other or both) during their three and one quarter years, respectively, were designed by [illegible], that other prevent them from being pre-medicine.[11]

In regards of a pre-medicine major, they appear in a frame-working exercise. Considering consequence be neither side. Thus, the [illegible] the [illegible] major was established to monitor the [illegible] in the U.S. and the other [illegible].[12]

The military [illegible], in analyzing it to a comparison, were primarily considering the military situation which is really [illegible] the [illegible] the military point division in the [illegible]. They were [illegible] relevant in one or the [illegible]. A secondary consideration was the effect that a [illegible] would have on Argentina and Uruguay. [illegible]'s policy was one of opposition to the U.S. (pro-[illegible]). This would have created a disagreement on [illegible] boundary.

As the [illegible] of the military alliance

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11. Robert Martin, A Survey of Life Sciences from Beginning to [illegible], (New York: [illegible], 1971), pp. 103-104.

12. Ibid., p. 165.

became more favorable, with the outcome inevitable, the military leaders shifted to a policy of full support of a war declaration. Besides the positive influence of a favorable military situation, they realized the people would support a war decision.

Even more important, if Brazil became an active participant, she would reap enormous benefits in terms of prestige by taking part in the peace negotiations as a member of the winning side. Furthermore, the equipment and assistance from the U.S. would place Brazil in the position of being the number one power in Latin America, thereby replacing Argentina, her traditional rival.

On this basis, the military leaders advocated direct military participation in the war. Vargas, partially in response to the will of the people as manifested by the anomic demonstrations, but primarily due to the influence of the military leaders who had now joined ranks with other pro-U.S. supporters such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oswaldo Aranha, decided on war.

The influence of the military, not only in this decision, but in all decisions of the Vargas regime, cannot be underestimated for there were no other organized, opposition interest groups in Brazilian society.

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based upon Freedom, with the common constituents, the military leaders relied on a policy of full support of a war mobilization. Despite the positive influence of a favorable military situation, they realized the public would support a war constitution.

Then some Democrats, if faced by opposed to entire participant, one would long maximum benefits to keep, of persists in taking part in the cause revolutionary a people of life giving aid. Furthermore, the movement and motivated from the war, would raise morale in the position of being the leader and leader in local medium, thereby providing impetus, and institutional aid.

On the basis, the military leaders, practical direct military participation in war. Thus, primarily in response to the aid of the people in leaders ten be the remote democratization, but primarily due to the influence of the military leaders who had not taken much aid other parts. procedure such as the "Militia-of-the-Union affair", Capital Punish, Boston on etc.

The technique of the military, and only in this position, not in all manifestations of the leaders origin, can not be generalized for their case as other organized, opposition between groups in Canadian society.

Labor was rigidly controlled, the bureaucracy was composed of Vargas supporters, the landed oligarchy supported him and the masses remained largely inarticulate. Therefore, military concurrance in the decision was of paramount importance.

Chapter IV

THE POLICY DECISION FOR WAR

EVENTS PRECIPITATING ACTION

An analysis of the Brazilian policy decision for war against the Axis reveals that the decision was dependent upon a multitude of factors, none of which was really significant, but in combination were sufficient to tip the scales in favor of the Allies. However, in the years immediately prior to the announcement of the decision on August 22, 1942, even the most informed Latin American experts were in doubt as to the side Brazil would finally opt for, or if she would remain neutral in the conflict despite a growing proclivity toward rejection of the Fascist influence.

The enigma posed by Brazil was partially the result of the semi-Fascist regime in power, the internal political situation with the dichotomy between the top level supporters of Vargas (Aranha-Pro-U.S./Military leaders-Pro-Axis), the trend of external events and the nationalistic trend exemplified by the reaction of the Brazilians to the war declaration.

Late in 1940, Ambassador Caffery negotiated concessions for bases (army, navy and blimp), from Amapa in the north to Santa Cruz in the south. This would have seemed to indicate, under prevailing measurements for

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diplomatic success, that Brazil was going to line up on the side of the Allies, if the decision had to be made. But even to December 7, 1941, Vargas was still undecided, still playing a cautious hand and refusing to become committed.[1] By the Rio Conference in January, 1942, Vargas was still dubious about taking the final step, but assented in the commitment to support the Allies. As events progressed during the months after Rio, it finally reached the point where the problem of whether or not to declare war could only be resolved in the affirmative. The recognition of a state of belligerency was almost an exact replay of the events as experienced by Brazil in World War I. Then, the war had been in its fourth year when Brazil joined on October 26, 1917. The United States had entered the war approximately six months earlier and the provocation was U-boat sinkings. The effective contributions consisted primarily of food supplies and a small naval force to patrol the Atlantic coast.

In 1942, the war was in its third year, the United States had entered eight months earlier and the provocation was the same, nineteen ships sunk by submarines.

The only divergence between the two periods was that in 1917, Congress declared war whereas in 1942, Vargas

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1. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning to Present, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 766.

diplomatic success, that Israel was going to take an on the side of the Allies, if the decision had to be made. On June 12 December 7, 1941, Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi published a statement and an article in Davar condemning Hitler's policies and the Nazis in Germany. Ben-Gurion, Ben-Zvi and Yitzhak Gruenbaum also wrote articles in the Hebrew press, warning about the dangers of Nazi rule. Ben-Gurion expressed in the government an support the Allies. He stated, progressed during his month after his, it finally reached the point where the threats of Nazi rule to declare war could only be resolved in the affirmative. The recognition of a state of belligerency was signed on behalf of the people of the world by Ben-Gurion, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi and Mordechai Shenhavi. The Jewish Agency and the Jewish Federation of Labor joined in the declaration of war on Germany, Italy and Japan.

In 1942, the war in the Middle East, the British Army had an area where Jewish fighting was the spearhead was the army, Palestine only was a country.

The main difference between the two periods was that in 1917, Jewish Brigade was formed in 1944, Turkey

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1. Moshe Pearlman, A History of Jewish Fighting from Bar-Kochba to Present, (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, Inc.), p. 102.

made the decision in the absence of a congress and then received cabinet approval.[2]

In response to the anomic demonstrations on August 21st for the sinking in one week of six ships, a state of belligerency was recognized the following day. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oswaldo Aranha, explained that a war declaration was not issued in deference to the proud tradition of Brazil in never declaring war on any nation.[3] Italy was included in the state of belligerency as it was considered integrated with Germany.

Japan was not included because of the potential threat of the immigrants within the country, largely located in relatively inaccessible strategic locations (Amazon), and the desire not to endanger Chile with its long, undefended coastline.[4] It wasn't until President Vargas issued a decree on June 6, 1945, that Brazil actively became a belligerent against Japan.[5] By that time, it hardly mattered one way or the other insofar as the United States was concerned.

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2. "Hemispheric Unity for Allies Bolstered by Brazil at War," Newsweek, August 31, 1942.

3. "Brazil: The New Ally," Fortune, November, 1942, p. 212.

4. The New York Times, August 23, 1942.

5. Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., Documents On American Foreign Relations: July 1944-June 1945, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 419.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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1. [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] 31, [illegible].

2. "[illegible]," [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], [illegible].

3. [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] 27, [illegible].

4. [illegible], [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], [illegible],

AN AFFIRMATIVE DECISION-THE REASONS

The final decision to enter the war was delayed an inordinate amount of time considering the provocations in the form of submarine attacks. However, President Vargas had wielded an extremely strong hand against the Axis minorities internally, in the period preceding the war, even to the extent of disregarding constitutional guarantees. He broke off diplomatic relations in 1942, rounded up Axis nationals, strengthened air/naval patrols and provided facilities for the United States Ferry Command. Furthermore, he had ordered Brazilian military reprisals against the German submarine menace.

The delay in the decision was a combination of the reluctance of the military leaders to make a decision, the possibility of an external attack by Germany and the reluctance to irrevocably commit economic life to the vagaries of U.S. policy makers.

Superficially, as previously outlined, the submarine provocation was the reason for the positive action against the Axis. The real reasons for deciding on war were probably a combination of the following:

1. Brazilian nationals had been mistreated in German occupied France.[6]

2. Sumner Welles refused to react hastily to the charges made concerning Fascist tendencies in Brazil. This served to support a friendly relationship, which in

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6. The New York Times, August 23, 1942.

[illegible] Patrolling [illegible] Bridge

[illegible] Bridge [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

turn undoubtedly contributed to the notion held by Vargas that the long-range interests of Brazil were intertwined with those of the United States.

3. The policy shift of the military leaders to support of the decision.

4. The population supported the decision-they wanted war for nationalistic reasons.

5. The economic, military and political benefits would far exceed the costs involved in the decision.

6. There was no organized opposition to the action.

7. The intellectuals supported the decision, for they were interested in opposing Fascism. They believed that participation on the side of democratic forces would provide a legitimate basis for opposition to Fascist tendencies within Brazil.

U.S.-BRAZILIAN MILITARY COOPERATION

The decision to become a belligerent envisioned the utilization of Brazilian troops in an overseas theatre of operation. If a Brazilian Expeditionary Force did not fight alongside the Allies overseas, the basic reasons for becoming a belligerent would have not been satisfied.

The genisis of the B.E.F. was probably a result of the correspondence between Roosevelt and Vargas in July, 1941. President Roosevelt, concerned with the Axis threat, invited Brazil to enter into a joint military endeavour

to enter the Azores, or Dutch Guiana to preclude German occupation, if a thrust westward was initiated by Hitler.[7] Although approved by Vargas in principle, no positive action was undertaken as the military situation never deteriorated to the point necessitating the implementation of the plan.

A second proposal for sending Brazilian troops to Puerto Rico was never executed, due to technical difficulties which caused the Brazilian and U.S. armies to oppose the plan.[8]

Shortly after Brazil entered the war, her military leaders publicly expressed the desire to undertake action overseas, some even urging independent action against Dakar in the Fall of 1942. This was vetoed by the State Department on the grounds that Brazilian Forces overseas would prompt similar requests from other Latin American nations. Moreover, the U.S. would have to equip and train these forces.[9]

On January 20, 1943, a joint defense commission for northeast Brazil recommended the establishment of a Brazilian garrison force in that area consisting of three

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7. William L. Langer and Everett S. Gleason, The Undeclared War, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 588.

8. Inter-American, August, 1943.

9. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 328.

to make the point, in fact [illegible] to provide [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

infantry divisions, one armoured division, eleven antiaircraft regiments and eleven coast artillery battalions. The recommendation was made in the knowledge that these forces were more than sufficient for defense, but the commission pointed out that they could probably be used overseas.[10]

On January 28, 1943, President Roosevelt stopped over in Brazil for a conference with President Vargas. Ostensibly, the meeting was held in order that F.D.R. could report on the results of the Casablanca Conference to President Vargas, and to affirm that the threat to Brazil had been eliminated by the North African expedition. However, the joint statement was couched in general terms. The Presidents said that they were meeting to survey the future safety of the Americas, that the aim of the U.S. and Brazil was to make the ocean safe for all and that in unity there is strength.[11]

The New York Times of January 30, 1943, reported that the meeting was held in order to discuss employment of Brazilian Forces overseas. It is highly likely that this was one of the major reasons for the conference and that the formal plans were given joint approval.

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10. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, p. 327.

11. Franklin Watts, ed., Voices of History 1943-1944, (New York: Gramercy Publishing Company, 1944), p. 18.

[illegible] Ibid.[illegible] The [illegible] activity, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The plan for the B.E.F. envisioned that Brazilian Forces would serve independently, but under the strategic direction of the United States.

By the end of 1943 and early 1944, the Allied offensives were gaining momentum. The threat to South America had been eliminated and the U.S. was obtaining all the strategic materials it could use. Therefore, we were content to stand on the Rio agreements which did not include overseas action by the Brazilians.[12]

Nevertheless, the Brazilian troops had been training since August, 1943 and were about ready to move overseas. The final decision to commit the troops to combat was probably influenced by the British view of the B.E.F. expressed by Winston Churchill. Churchill was firmly in support of the B.E.F. and said:

> "I am all for getting the Brazilian division into Italy as soon as possible. Every effort should be made subject to battle exigencies, to bring this division into Italy. There should be no talk of a token force. The above also applies to the air squadron."[13]

In July, 1944, the B.E.F. arrived in Italy eager for action. They were assigned to General Clark's Fifth Army and placed in the line along the Tyrrhenian coastal area so as to hold the left flank on the drive north.

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12. John C. Campell and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 208.

13. Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring: The Second World War, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 708.

The Vichy lion has fallen, motivated not Gaullist forces would assume independently, but under the auspices directly of the United States.

By the end of 1943 and early 1944, the Allied officials were quite certain. The threat to their service had been eliminated and the U.S. was obtaining all the strategic materials it could use. Therefore, we were content to stand on the agreements which had been made between General de Gaulle and the Allies.[12]

Nevertheless, the Brazilian troops had been training since August, 1943 and were about ready to move overseas. The final decision to commit this force to combat was probably influenced by the British view of the F.E.F. expressed by Winston Churchill. Churchill was fairly in support of the F.E.F. and said:

> "I am all for getting the Brazilian division into Italy as soon as possible. Every effort should be made subject to battle exigencies, to bring this division into Italy. There should be no talk of a token force. The above also applies to the air squadron."[13]

In fact, 1944, the F.E.F. arrived in Italy ready for duty. They were assigned to General Clark's Fifth Army and joined in the line along the Tyrrhenian coastal area on or just one left flank on the drive north.

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12. Leahy to Donovan and the Joint Chiefs of the Donovan on Foreign Relations, The Joint Chiefs to Leahy, Foreign Relations 1943-1947, The Joint Chiefs to Donovan, 1947), p. 108.

13. Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring: The Second World War, (London: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 108.

The Brazilian remained in Italy until the following July, but actually spent only seven months in combat. The action during the winter was limited to small engagements and the Germans surrendered on May 2, 1945.

The question arises as to how effective the B.E.F. was in Italy and whether or not the consensus regarding their role is indicative of the actual military contribution to the final victory.

In formulating answers to these questions, several aspects of the cooperation have to be considered. For example, the strategy involved in Italy, the time element with reference to the arrival and departure of the B.E.F. and the military action in the interval. An analysis of these various factors indicates that the contributions to the military victory in Italy were rather insignificant.

The strategy in Italy was to create a diversionary effort so as to force the withholding of German troops from the western front. Consequently, an inordinate melange of nationalities, races, religious and cultural groups were assigned to Italy. This created enormous problems of unity of command, language and logistics.

The net result was more of a holding action than a sustained drive for victory, at least insofar as the

ground forces were concerned.

An indication of the extent of the Brazilian military effort can be gleaned from the number of casualties suffered from May, 1944 - April, 1945.

The total reported was 2,112 killed, wounded and missing which included a period far to the middle of July, 1944 when the B.E.F. wasn't in Italy.[14]

In comparison with U.S. casualties in the same theatre, the Brazilians suffered relatively few which could only be a reflection of limited combat action.

The erroneous idea that the Brazilians captured a German division. In reality, the Germans surrendered to the Brazilians, directly opposite their positions at the cessation of hostilities on May 2, 1945.

The simple truth of the matter is that the Brazilians entered combat in Italy when, for all practical purposes, the Germans were already defeated. The Allies controlled the seas around Italy, the German Luftwaffe was virtually non-existent and the German army was seriously handicapped by supply shortages. In short, the B.E.F. was never really tested against a fighting force in modern combat.

This analysis is not meant to be an indictment of the B.E.F. or the valiant troops of the other Allied

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14. The New York Times, April 15, 1945.

forces in Italy. The point is that the concensus on the B.E.F. is that it performed on a military plane equal to that of the modern powers. This view has persisted until today, specifically in the interest of inter-American relations, but it provides a distorted view of the military capabilities of the lesser developed nations.

In contrast, the F.A.B., Brazilian Air Force squadron in Italy, performed on a comparable level with U.S. squadrons. The small Brazilian navy in the South Atlantic did exceedingly well. In conjunction with U.S. naval forces, they sank a total of nineteen submarines, guarded 3,167 ships in 614 convoys with a loss of not one-tenth of one percent.[15]

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15. Homer C. Votaw, "The Brazilian Navy in World War Two," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, p. 404.

[illegible] Thus, while it has been the [illegible] on the U.S., it has not [illegible] on a [illegible] [illegible] equal in [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], specifically [illegible] the [illegible] of inter-[illegible] [illegible], but it provides a [illegible] view of the [illegible] [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

In conclusion, the U.S.S., [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] in [illegible], [illegible] on a [illegible] level with U.K. [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible] in the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. In [illegible] with U.S. [illegible] [illegible], they [illegible] a [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] 3,147 [illegible] in 83% [illegible] with a [illegible] or [illegible] [illegible] or [illegible] [illegible].[15]

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15. [illegible] G. [illegible], "The [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]," [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible], 4[illegible].

Chapter V

EFFECTS OF THE POLICY DECISION

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Oswaldo Aranha, on a visit to the United States in 1939, commented on the interest of the United States in Brazil. He said:

> "When I go back to my country, I shall propose that we erect a statue of Herr Hitler. It is Hitler who has at last succeeded in drawing the attention of the United States to Brazil."[1]

This rather accurately described the existing relationship between the two American republics, for at no period since their independence had the United States been more interested in meeting the needs of the Brazilians.

From that time onward the U.S. was continually active in soliciting Brazilian support and endeavouring to maintain some semblance of equality in their joint prosecution of the war effort.

Although relations had always been amiable, there wasn't a genuine U.S. concern for Brazil and its problems before 1939. Undoubtedly, this was partially due to geography, language and cultural differences. In addition, it was also due to the fact that diplomatic interest was oriented on an east-west rather than a north-south axis.

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1. Fortune, June, 1939, p. 43.

CHAPTER I

ORIGINS OF THE EQUITY TRADITION

FOUNDING A NATION

The remaining chapter for another strategy, using the theme, can a visit by the United States in 1777, concerned on the behalf of the United States in 1777. He stated

> "When I go back to my country, I will remember that we spend a stretch of hard history. It is likely the one in which succeeded in drafter the constitution of the United States in 1789."[1]

This trait particularly manifested the relation relationship between the two nations themselves. For it is [illegible] these independence and the United States [illegible] in making the basis of its foundation.

From this time onward the U.S. has constantly active in political [illegible] and [illegible] to maintain some influence or [illegible] to [illegible] processing or use the method.

Although relations has [illegible] good [illegible], there was't a problem [illegible] for [illegible] and [illegible] before 1776. Nationally, this was particularly [illegible] procedure, language and [illegible]. In addition, it was also due to the fact that [illegible] interest was [illegible] as an [illegible] rather than a [illegible] [illegible].

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1. [illegible], [illegible], p. 82.

The political implications of the wartime cooperation can best be understood by consideration of the psychology involved in being aligned with the Allies, participating in military combat in Europe and in developing the most powerful armed forces in all of South America.

Brazil, the first Latin American nation to fight in Europe, was immensely proud of her military contribution. The fact that she had done so was proof to the world that she had arrived as a military power. This provided an impetus to the nationalistic aspirations to become the leading power in South America vis-a-vis Argentina. Moreover, it promoted nationalism within the country which acted to decrease the regional antipathies prevalent before the war.

Obviously, as a member of the victorious Allies, Brazil was in a position of paramount importance internationally, insofar as South America was concerned.

Internally, the effect on Brazil was to freeze the Vargas regime in power, since the security of the hemisphere was threatened. Hence, political, social and economic reforms were delayed for several years. This policy was supported by the United States in the interest of maintaining stability and thereby ensuring cooperation.

Nevertheless, there were manifestations of internal discontent which became more numerous as the war drew to a close. A characteristic example of the type of criticism of the regime was the "Manifesto of the Statesmen and Intellectuals of Minas Geraes" signed by such leading citizens as Arthur Bernardes, President of the Republic from 1922-1926, Alfonso Penna, Jr., former president of the Liberal Alliance and Mario Brant, former president of the Banco de Brazil.

The statement which they signed was as follows:

> "If we are fighting against Fascism alongside the United Nations so that freedom and democracy may be reestablished in all countries, it is certainly not too much to claim for ourselves the rights and guarantees which characterize freedom and democracy."[2]

These progressive elements, in support of the military leaders, provided the impetus for the removal of President Vargas when the opportune moment arose.

Since Brazil was fighting on the Allied side, the military leadership by the wars end was pro-democratic, or at least anti-totalitarian. After the defeat of Germany and Italy, the military leaders forced Vargas into retirement, when it appeared that he might try to

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2. J. Alvarez Del Vayo, "Brazil Has An Underground," Nation, February 26, 1944, p. 249.

sustain his position as president, despite reassurances to the contrary during the war. Both major parties named generals to head their presidential tickets which resulted in Eurico Dutra winning the presidency.

Many of the officers retained the prejudices of the landowning class and were convinced that they could rule better than a democratically elected government.[3] This contributed to the political instability within Brazil which hindered further development socially, economically and politically.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Just prior to 1940, Brazil had been experiencing a boom. There had been a large increase in building new roads, factories and housing.[4] The impact of the war had a disturbing effect upon the economy as the blockade of Europe, lack of shipping space and shortages of consumer goods tended to impose strains on the economic life which Brazil was not geared to handle.

In order to alleviate these strains and the consequent pressures for industrialization, the United States

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3. Lawrence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), pp. 222-223.

4. Samuel Guy Inman, "Brazil of Vargas," Nation, October 12, 1940.

artistic air pervading an operation, thereby transforming it into something resembling the rite. Only under such [illegible] conditions [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

embarked on assistance programs designed to maintain the economic status quo and, if possible, to promote increased development.

Even with United States assistance, the increased pressures for greater industrialization were not translated into reality, as the needs of Brazil were greater than the capabilities of the United States for their satisfaction. The disruption of the flow of desired materials, as a consequence of the submarine war, also acted to hinder economic growth.

Despite the difficulties encountered by Brazil during the war, there were some positive economic benefits accruing to Brazil. The steel industry was given a tremendous boost by U.S. support of the Volta Redonda steel complex. Gains were certainly made in the agricultural diversification program.

Particularly important was the large increase in exports over imports during the war which resulted in a surplus of about one-half billion dollars at its termination.[5] This constituted a tremendous reserve of purchasing power which could have been utilized to speed up the economic development of Brazil when industrial imports became available. Unfortunately, the surplus

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5. Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America From Beginning to Present, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 770.

was rapidly expended after the war and certainly contributed to the inflation. The shortages of consumer goods during the war led to rationing and, thence, to price fixing which also contributed to the inflation.

One extremely beneficial effect of the economic cooperation was the emphasis on the total approach to economic development. Previously, economic problems had been analyzed as if they were independent of other economic problems. However, the wartime planning and use of the Cooke Technical Mission redirected the attention of the government to the necessity of conducting developmental programs wherein all economic problems are considered in relationship to one another rather than independently, as had been the practice in the past.[6]

The economic effects of the war had positive and deleterious effects upon the economy. In the long run, if as much economic assistance had been provided in the post-war period as had been provided during the war, the effects would have been mitigated to such an extent, that the economic development of the country could have continued unhindered.

It is probably safe to speculate that without the wartime economic cooperation, the effects of the war on Brazil would have been catastrophic.

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6. Jose Jobim, Brazil in the Making, (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1943), p.501.

[illegible] provides [illegible] for [illegible] available [illegible] in the [illegible]. [illegible] of [illegible] which [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

SOCIAL REFORM

The earlier cooperation created pressures for social change in Brazil. Prior to the war, the inarticulate masses had been indifferent to their plight. Organized labor had acquiesced in the rule of Vargas, since they were more interested in security which was provided by a whole range of social legislation supported by him, than in agitation for representative government.

The war effort served to hasten the inflow of the population to the urban areas, uprooted large numbers of the populace and transferred them to other states (Amazon rubber project), brought the Brazilians into closer contact with the large numbers of Americans working in Brazil and caused social stresses/strains culminating in increased support for democratic government. The liberals favored freedom without reform while the people were interested in reform even without liberty.[7]

The returning servicemen of the B.E.F. constituted a new force in Brazil. In effect, there were two armies; that of the Minister of War, who had remained at home and that of the expeditionary force that had been

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7. Alceo Amoroso Lima, "Voices of Liberty and Reform in Brazil," Freedom and Reform in Latin America, Frederick B. Pike, ed., (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 300.

blooded in Italy. The government took measures to disperse the B.E.F. by transferring the officers and men to different units throughout the country.[8] This only hastened the process of social change. The dispersion of the force, while depriving it of its potential for support of a coup d'etat, spread the officers and men, influenced by their associations in Italy, among units previously unaware of the existence of social problems.

All of the above factors contributed to the eventual overthrow of Vargas. It can be argued that most of the factors mentioned would have occurred in the course of events, but without the war, the process would have certainly been much slower.

MILITARY POWER

The war gave Brazil a unique opportunity to make important advances in the military sphere. Vargas, after making the decision to become a belligerent, was active in support of the U.S. effort. In return, Brazil continued to receive credit, lend-lease arms and to exercise a muted voice in allied councils.

The B.E.F., by participating in the European combat operations, gained a significant advantage in

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8. "Brazil Emerges From War Second Power in Americas," Newsweek, August 13, 1945.

terms of experience, training, modern arms, and prestige over that of its neighbor, Argentina. In fact, at the end of the war, Brazil was the most powerful nation in Latin America. Since military power provides the basis for political power on the international scene, Argentina was also surpassed in this respect.

In retrospect, the primary effect of the military cooperation was to place Brazil in a position to provide continental leadership for South America. This could have proved beneficial for the whole area, if the leadership had been exercised in a manner consistent with the democratic principles Brazil professed to be fighting for in Italy.

Unfortunately, advantage was not taken of the opportunity with the result that Brazil is still pressing to regain her place of primacy once held in the southern half of the hemisphere.

Chapter VI

A GENERAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL

The effects of the Brazilian policy decision to actively engage in World War Two as a belligerent had an enormous impact on its process of development. The extent and nature of this impact has not been fully analyzed, even today. By a careful review of the factors surrounding the decision, some tentative conclusions can be drawn which may have relevance, not only to Brazil, but to other countries in the same developmental stage as she was in 1942. I would expect that the conclusions would be particularly pertinent to the Latin American countries, behind Brazil in development, but exhibiting the characteristic rightist-authoritarian governmental structure manifested by the Vargas regime.

The analysis of the developmental process, from both political and economic standpoints, is of rather recent origin. The reasons for this can be found in the deficiencies in economic theory until just prior to World War Two. In addition, the political upheaval throughout the world in the last twenty-five years has forced the political scientists to focus their attention on the lesser developed countries.

The advances in economic theory, the redirection of attention on political development, and the social implications inherent in the process have contributed to the formation of a framework, within which various models of the developmental process may be utilized, for explanation of the phenomenon.

In regard to Brazil, in the period under consideration, the models of G. Almond J. Coleman, R. Silvert, and A. Hirshman are useful in an examination of the events that transpired in the Vargas era, for they had a profound affect upon the evolution of the nation.

The Almond/Coleman model is a functional analysis of a political system in which the input and output functions are broken down into the following categories:

Input Functions	Output Functions
1. Political socialization	1. Rule making
2. Interest articulation	2. Rule application
3. Interest aggregation	3. Rule adjudication
4. Political Communication[1]	

The manner in which these functions are performed in a political system can be analysed, thus enabling a comparison of systems. This comparison should provide a basis for projection of the developmental process as well as illuminating those facets of the process acting as barriers to progress.

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1. G. Almond and J. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 17.

In Almond/Coleman terms the Brazilian political system under Vargas in 1930-1945 was regressive in nature, since the input-output functions performed by the system were narrowed in scope.

The political socialization process, the sum total of the attitudes and value standards toward the political culture, although probably enhanced, particularly as a result of the policy decision for war, was not sufficiently altered to produce lasting change.

The political recruitment function, which inducts members of society into the political life of the nation, received a severe setback in 1937 with the establishment of the "New State," for political parties were barred, elections prohibited and the bureaucratic apparatus staffed by Vargas supporters.

An interesting aspect of the Vargas regime is the fact that he relied upon a combination of personalistic rule with support of the military and the landed oligarchy in preference to organized political party support.

Inherent in this type of support was the articulation of interests through the established institutional interest groups, the military forces, the bureaucracy, and the oligarch. Anomic interest groups, the

spontaneous demonstrations, articulated interests, but there is some evidence to support the charge that the Department of Press and Propaganda (D.I.P.), stage-managed some of them to evoke support for Vargas.[2]

The Vargas regime was of a rightist-authoritarian cast which resulted in the performance of the interest aggregation function at the apex of the system. The Vargas style was to discern the interests of the supporting institutional interest groups, aggregate their interests and decree general governmental policies designed to satisfy the requirements of those groups.

The political communications function of the system was basically under the control of the D.I.P.. Since a democratic system must ensure the effective neutrality of the communications media, the governmental control ensured that a biased slant was maintained in the political communications emanating from the top of the political pyramid.

In the performance of the governmental functions, the rule making and application functions were combined in the executive and the institutional interest groups. The rule adjudication function was relatively free as

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2. G. Almond and J. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 498.

Vargas left the courts mostly to their own devices. However, the rule adjudication function is of little importance in a system in which the laws are made by decree and enforced by the supporters of the regime.

The political system of Vargas can probably be characterized as a modernizing oligarchy. While system is controlled by bureaucratic and officer interest groups, the democratic constiution is suspended, or innocuous in effect, and the goals of the elites are directed at eliminating corruption while inculcating efficiency and rationality into the system.[3]

Within this system, the paramount factor for our consideration, is the fact that the rule-making function is performed by the chief executive in conformance with the limits set by the power centers, i.e., the military.

Due to the nature of the system, as outlined above, the chief executive must function as a reform-monger (Hirschman), in order to achieve the desired results, especially if imbued with the ideas of progress. Of course, this may take the form of economic development and a lengthy period of social reform as an alternative to implemenating changes in the political system at the outset which would hasten the whole developmental process. This was the path chosen by Vargas.

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3. G. Almond and J. Coleman, eds., The Politics of Developing Areas, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 53.

[illegible] the source [illegible] to [illegible] the [illegible].
However, [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] in a [illegible] in which [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

The political system of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. While [illegible] [illegible]
is [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible], and the [illegible] of the [illegible] are
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [

The decision for war halted the process of political development by freezing the regime in power, while concurrently forcing the changes required for social and economic advance.

In the previous analysis of the decision, certain facets of the Vargas action in making and implementing the decision can be viewed as the action of a reform-monger.

Utilization of the Almond/Coleman model is relevant in that it is of general applicability to all political systems. However, both models are deficient in that one is too general and the other is not specific enough.

I believe that to develop a model for use in development, you must first proceed from the general, Almond and Coleman, thence, to the more specific model of Hirschman. From that point, which involves a historical analysis, the specific decisions concerning policy must be analyzed in terms of not only inputs-outputs and feedback, but also in terms of the costs/benefits and short/long-run goals of the various elements and groups constituting society. Additionally, the external influences upon the decision must also be examined.

This approach, which is an extension of the basic

reformmonger approach in terms of costs/benefits and goals can best be explained in reference to the Brazilian war decision in the following manner:

> The first requirement is that there must be an enumeration of the various classes and groups interested in the specific decision and the degree to which this interest is demonstrated in terms of both short and long-run goals. The costs and benefits must then be computed and can be done in general terms.

From an outline of the aforementioned factors, it should be possible, not only to pin-point the groups or classes hindering enactment of a policy decision, but also the policies which should be implemented so as to reduce the costs and increase the benefits with regard to the same groups.

The Brazilian policy decision for war would approximate the following in the above terms:

Decision for war	Short-run goals	Long-run goals
Vargas	- → +	+
Military Leaders	←	
(Army)	- → +	+
(Navy)	+	+
Bureaucracy	+	+
Landed Oligarchy	+	+
Labor	+	+
Entrepreneurs	+	+
Pro-U.S. Supporters	+	+
Middle Class	+	+
Inarticulate Masses	+	+

The pluses indicate support of the decision and a negative sign, opposition.

The inarticulate masses were probably in favor of war, simply as a result of the nationalistic feelings

engendered in reaction to the submarine losses. This is especially true, in view of the fact that almost two hundred of the lives lost belonged to soldiers conscripted from the ranks of the masses. In any case, since their interests were not subject to articulation, their influence upon the decision was negligible in the cost/benefit sense. Therefore, in the absence of opposition by the masses, it is safe to insert pluses for them [illegible] as we are concerned with positive action.

The middle class rates a plus under both short and long-run goals largely as the result of the peculiar brand of nationalism prevalent in Brazil in 1942. In the short-run, the members of the middle class, although not really recognizable as a class, due to the many diversities encompassed in the appellation, were in support of the decision from their own self interest. Belligerency would virtually assure them of a role in the implementation of the decision. Additionally, most of the members of the class held the views of the upper class and had hopes of joining it.

The pro-U.S. supporters (Oswaldo Aranha), were firm in the belief that in both the cost/benefit sense and goals, Brazil's future was dependent upon full

support of U.S. policy. The extent of this support could be best manifested by fighting alongside the Allies.

The entrepreneurs were initially in opposition to a pro-U.S. stand by Brazil, as their economic interests were dependent upon continued close economic relations with the Axis. Higher prices for their products, lower purchasing prices for their imported goods and the promise of a permanent arrangement in this regard, acted to preclude a commitment to the U.S. However, as the war progressed and the military situation was such that it didn't permit trade with the Axis, their position shifted in response to the U.S. economic assistance. They began to realize that their success was also dependent upon the growth and vitality of the Brazilian economy, which could only be maintained by the U.S.

Labor was in full support of the decision. By labor, I mean the industrial workers, for the agricultural laborers were not organized. In the case of the industrial laborers, their benefits flowed directly from the social legislation enacted by Vargas. As previously pointed out, they were more interested in security than reform. Furthermore, they provided the bulk of the

economy of U.S. motive. The Korean conflict is most
social as well modified by placing economics the
action.

The anti-communist zeal typically is motivation to
a pro-U.S. stand or trend, or timely economic interests
were independent upon continued alive a complete relations
with the area, Japan relies too labor produces, lower
manufacturing costs for electrical goods and the
exports of Japanese arrangement in this period, acted
to produce a condition to aid U.S. Moreover, the pro
protection and its rightly attention are that that it
aids' trend again vital the area, about providing aided
in programs to the U.S. economic assistance. They began
to realize that trade whether was also dependent upon
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rather. Furthermore, they provided the bulk of the

support for the decision in the anemic demonstrations, just prior to acknowledgement of the state of belligerency.

The landed oligarchy provided support for Vargas throughout his regime. Despite the fact that many of the Vargas measures were unpalatable, they firmly believed that the war would enable the political system to maintain the status quo which was in their interests.

The bureaucracy favored the decision for many of the same reasons. Large developmental programs and their continuance after the war would enhance their position.

Of the military leaders, the Navy had been pro-U.S. for many years. Moreover, they had already been engaged in combat against the submarine menace for approximately six months before the decision for war was made. Obviously, their own interest would be served by war.

The army leaders, however, had been indoctrinated by the Axis throughout the thirties in the military assistance programs of Germany and Italy. Their equipment was provided by the Axis and more important, the possibility of being on the losing side made them hesitate. This was a short-run view, for they knew

[illegible] for the decision in the [illegible] case, [illegible] under [illegible] of [illegible].

The Board [illegible] provided support for [illegible] [illegible]. Despite the fact that [illegible] [illegible] were [illegible], many firms believed that the [illegible] would [illegible] the political [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] favored the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. Large [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

[illegible] military [illegible], the Navy [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]. [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

that in the long-run they would be far better off in support of the United States. They were already cooperating with the U.S. in many phases of their military activities, i.e., facilities for the "victory corridor," military assistance programs and pilot training assistance.

Vargas was in a quandry. He could only make those decisions in which the military concurred, specifically the army leaders, as they exercised the veto power. He knew that in the attainment of the long-run goals he desired for Brazil, military cooperation would cement the U.S.-Brazilian relationship.

It is relatively easy to ascertain that the only negative reaction to the decision was provided by Vargas (indecisive), and the army leaders (opportunists). In addition, the making of a positive decision was dependent, not on the long-run goals, but on those of the short-run. The key was the army leaders. As the military situation was altered by the trend of external events and the passage of time, the military realized that even in the short-run, their interests would be better served by war. Additionally, they would be the implementors of the decision. Therefore, they exerted

pressure on Vargas forcing a reassessment of his position. Since the veto power was removed, Vargas acknowledged belligerency.

The feedback from this decision was evident as the war progressed. The intellectuals reacted negatively toward the Vargas government. The final result of the feedback was the dissatisfaction with the regime and the replacement of Vargas concurrent with the return of the electoral process.

In applying this model to the problems of social reform, industrial and political development, the same procedure is applicable. Attention is directed at identifying the groups, determining their goals and computing the cost/benefits involved in the implementation of a decision. It is obvious that there will be some groups opposed as their goals will necessitate a negative reaction. This is due to the costs involved. Hence, the problem becomes one of implementing the policies or procedures designed to change the cost/benefit relationship.

Proof of the applicability of this model is available in the Venezuelan land reform program which has proceeded generally in accordance with expectations and in which, the costs have been borne by the state to

such an extent that the land owners acquiesced in the program.

Applied to the problem of an inter-American defense force, the same procedure reveals that in the case of Brazil, under present conditions, the benefits of the force far exceed the costs involved. Brazil, with its military leadership, preponderance of military power in South America and continental leadership aspirations can only support an arrangement of this type.

Needless to say, the cost/benefit relationship is not dependent entirely on monetary costs involved in reform programs, for there are other costs/benefits of a nebulous type which have to be entered into the computations.

In summary, the examination of the Brazilian decision for war reveals that the crucial factor is the making of a decision contrary to the desires of opposition groups. Hirschman discounts this by emphasizing that wrong decisions have been made with the result that the particular problem is either not resolved, or that the effect of the decision is to increase the severity of the problem.

This may well be true, but I firmly believe that

work is carried out in the [illegible] [illegible] to the process.

Similar to the problem of an open-loop [illegible] system, the [illegible] [illegible] that in the case of [illegible], under [illegible] conditions, the [illegible] of the [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. Should, with the [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] of [illegible] power in [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] not only [illegible] an [illegible], or [illegible] [illegible].

Problems in [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] is not [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] of a [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible].

In [illegible], the [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

the basic problem of reform is one of inaction rather than action. The fact that some decisions are made in order to avoid antagonistic solutions is indicative of the fact that the wrong approach is being utilized in the solution of the problems. Action is undertaken on problems without realizing that the cost/benefit relationship must be altered to reduce opposition, rather than circumventing the issue, by the introduction of non-antagonistic measures. Implementation of antagonistic solutions for development problems is not the answer, for the costs are too high.

If evolution rather than revolution is the desired objective, then the reformmonger model, as refined by emphasis on measures to reduce opposition of interest groups to change, in terms of cost/benefit and short/long-run goals, is the most feasible approach.

I realize that this study may be a rather superficial analysis of the problem of reform in regard to the case of the Brazilian policy decision, but the intent of this exposition will be accomplished, if interest is renewed in the decision making process for the solution of the problems of reform.

the basic problem of reform is one of improving public
than policy. The first step some critics are made in
order to avoid antagonizing entrenched interests of
the free ships are always approach is being utilized in
the solution of the problem. Which is unfortunate as
problems without antagonizing that the most benefit
relationship must be allowed to reduce opposition, rather
than circumvention the issue, by the introduction of con-
troversial measures. Implementation of comprehensive
solutions for difficult problems is not the answer,
for the issue are too dire.

If evolution rather than revolution is the desired
objective, then the referendum could, as method of
exploit as an means to reduce opposition of interest
groups to obtain some of cost benefit and the
long-run goal, in the most feasible manner.

I realize that this study can be a prime empir-
ical analysis of the problem of reform in regard to
the area of the maritime policy decision, but the
intent of this approach will be accomplished. If
interest is received in the decision making process, the
the solution of the problem of reform.

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